Project S.H.A.D.
Chemical & Biological Experiments
on U.S. Navy Personnel

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S.H.A.D.
Shipboard Hazard and Defense

Project SHAD: American Servicemen Used As Guinea Pigs  

Project SHAD, an acronym for Shipboard Hazard and Defense, was part of the joint service chemical and biological warfare test program conducted during the 1960s. Project SHAD encompassed tests designed to identify US warships' vulnerabilities to attacks with chemical or biological warfare agents and to develop procedures to respond to such attacks while maintaining a war-fighting capability. Although classified, the Department of Defense has been actively pursuing declassification of relevant medical information. To date twelve SHAD projects have been evaluated and released for your review.

The SHAD program planned as many as a hundred individual tests and was part of the larger Deseret Test Center program. Many tests were never actually executed. DoD investigators plan to look at all Deseret Test Center’s chemical and biological tests conducted between 1963 and 1970

Of the 4,300 sailors known to be involved, to our knowledge, only 622 have been notified.

http://www.projectshad.org/index.htm


Statement

of

The Honorable William Winkenwerder, Jr., M.D., M.B.A.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs

on

Shipboard Hazard and Defense

Before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs

July 10, 2002

Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and thank you for your continuing support of the men and women who have served in our Armed Forces.

As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, I want to stress that the Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we deploy fit and healthy military personnel, that we monitor their health and environmental exposures while they are deployed, and that we assess their health status and address their health concerns when they return. My Deployment Health Support Directorate is conducting the investigation into Project SHAD. Today, I would like to explain some of the challenges we face in the investigation into Project SHAD, and why I think problems associated with that situation, particularly in regard to medical record keeping, are not likely to occur for post-Gulf War operations.

As you know, Project SHAD (Shipboard Hazard and Defense) was a chemical and biological weapons vulnerability testing program conducted in the 1960s by the Deseret Test Center in Utah. In August of 2000, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs requested that the Secretary of Defense provide information concerning three classified Project SHAD tests: Autumn Gold, Copper Head and Shady Grove. In September 2000 DoD assigned responsibility for fulfilling that request to the Deployment Health Support Directorate. Within a month, VA and DoD personnel began meeting regularly to define what medically relevant information the VA needed to address veterans' concerns. This collaborative effort established a communications process, coordination for the exchange of information between the agencies, and a format for fact sheets to inform the VA, veterans and the public about the nature of these exposures and the agents used.

SHAD was part of a larger program called Project 112, which was itself one of many projects run by the Deseret Test Center. Project 112 consisted of 103 chemical and biological warfare agent tests. SHAD involved thirty-four planned tests, many of which were never performed. These were not clinical trials, but rather were done for operational preparedness purposes. Leaders at the time thought they were appropriate tests given the information they then had available. So far, our investigation indicates that most of the tests were done using simulants that were thought to be harmless. Moreover, service members involved in tests using live agents were appropriately protected. Nonetheless, the Deployment Health Support Directorate quickly recognized the necessity to investigate all Project 112 and SHAD tests, and expanded the scope of the original effort.

The first year of this investigation we discovered the difficulties in obtaining the needed medically relevant information and put systems in place to overcome them. First, we had to find the needed documents. In the 1960's, joint operations were not so common. The Army planned the SHAD tests, but for the most part the Navy and Marine Corps conducted the tests, with assistance from the Air Force. The primary planning was done at the Deseret Test Center, a facility that closed in the early 1970's. Records that were kept were stored at different facilities in different geographic areas, ranging from Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. Remember, these test plans and reports are not computer files but paper records stored in boxes or folders in file cabinets, so finding what you need is a painstaking manual process.

Learning who may have been involved in a particular test involves finding personnel records in the Navy archives. Navy deck logs aren't found in the military system at all, but are maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration. At this point our investigators believe they have established the locations of most of the relevant records. Of course, the ongoing search could lead to new locations and we will pursue those leads until we have all relevant data.

When the desired test reports are located, there is still the task of declassification. Most of the operation plans and results of these tests remain classified. These documents contain operational information about ship vulnerability to and defenses against chemical and biological weapons. These agents remain a threat to our forces today so, as you can understand, these records can not be casually declassified. DHSD developed a solution. Investigators with appropriate clearances comb through the documents to identify the medically relevant data. Early on, VA staff members who also held appropriate clearances joined our investigators to verify that the information being sought was what they needed to help settle benefits questions. Following the identification of these specific topic areas, our investigators requested that specific information be declassified. The Army has greatly expedited this declassification process.

When we first provided data to the VA we learned that DoD and VA computer systems were not compatible. Both agencies have made the necessary adjustments to allow the smooth transfer of this information. We now have the data the VA needs formatted in such a way that they can use it immediately and easily. In fact, I believe that one positive outcome of this investigation has been a new level of cooperation between the VA and DoD that is focused on providing the information our veterans need and deserve.

To date we have produced fact sheets on 12 SHAD tests, which involved between 2700 and 2800 service members. The VA has a process in place for notifying the service members, however, we understand the VA has a significant challenge in identifying them because at the time they served, they were identified by service numbers, not their social security numbers. The process to translate service numbers to social security numbers is also labor intensive. So, to give the VA time to make positive identifications, we are implementing a process to provide the VA with the list of names and service numbers as soon as we have them, before the investigation of a particular test is completed. And as soon as complete information becomes available, we will continue to share it with the VA and the public.

At the time of the project SHAD tests, there was little awareness of the possible long-term effects of low level toxic exposures. Our recognition of the importance of individual assignments, unit locations and documenting medically relevant exposures following the Gulf War have dramatically changed our processes. Today, DoD monitors the service member's environment closely. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine and the Naval Environmental Health Center maintain environmental surveillance wherever our military forces go. For example, you may have seen news reports of possible chemical warfare agent exposures at Karshi Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan. Routine environmental monitoring discovered what appeared to be traces of possible chemical agents on the base. The base commander immediately cleared the areas where the contamination was suspected and notified troops of the situation. Closer investigation proved that the substances that caused the alert were not chemical warfare agents. However, that example does demonstrate that we have procedures to protect our people from environmental dangers, and that we keep them aware of possible risks.

We are also dedicated to improvements in medical record keeping. In this area, DoD has stepped boldly into the 21
st century. The services have made individual efforts to fulfill today's requirements. We plan to consolidate those efforts into a joint program under the Theater Medical Information Program, or TMIP. TMIP, which is being tested right now, is a tri-Service system designed to provide information to deployed medical forces to support all medical functional areas, including medical logistics, blood management, patient regulation and evacuation, medical intelligence, health care delivery and more. TMIP will integrate several existing and developmental systems into a single system that can be easily used by theater commanders and medical personnel in combat environments. It will also provide an electronic record of care provided in theater that can be entered into the individual's permanent medical record and provided to the VA

DoD is in the process of setting up a system that will monitor the health of all military members for the duration of their service. It will begin with the Recruit Assessment Program, which will collect comprehensive baseline health data from all U.S. military personnel. That program is in pilot testing right now.

After deployments, service members now receive care based on a set of clinical practice guidelines for post-deployment evaluation and treatment developed jointly by DoD and VA medical personnel. The guidelines are designed to assist health care providers in screening and evaluating service members and veterans with health concerns following deployment.

At the other end of the system is a joint DoD/VA exit physical for service members who are returning to civilian life.

We already have a number of initiatives working through our VA/DoD Executive Council, co-chaired by myself and my colleague Dr. Roswell, the VA Under Secretary for Health. This council provides the forum for senior health care leaders, including our Surgeons General, to proactively address potential areas for further collaboration, and resolve obstacles to sharing.

We are building on the success of our health care council through the newly established VA/DoD Benefits Council, which is examining ways to expand and improve information sharing, refining the process of records retrieval and identifying procedures to improve the benefits claims process. The VA/DoD Joint Executive Council, co- chaired by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Deputy Secretary of the VA, brings the leadership of the Health and Benefits councils together quarterly to demonstrate their commitment to improving inter-departmental cooperation at all levels. As Under Secretary of Defense David Chu said of the first meeting, "Our concern for the well-being of service members extends beyond just their time on active duty." The two panels will work together to improve coordination between the departments in such areas as health care services, benefits delivery, information sharing and capital asset coordination. The future will hold increased cooperation between our departments, because our focus is the health of our service members throughout their military careers and throughout the rest of their lives.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I thank you and the members of this committee for your outstanding and continuing support for the men and women of the Department of Defense. Now, what are your questions?


Links:

Project 112

Pentagon slow to study chemical tests
VA HASN'T TOLD ALL SOLDIERS INVOLVED IN 1960S

Soldiers exposed in 109 chemical tests, Pentagon says

US Used Deadly Sarin in Hawaii Test-Pentagon

Pentagon: No More GI Guinea Pigs

The Pentagon gassed American soldiers and civilians in 1960s tests

History of Biological Warfare