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Project SHAD: American Servicemen Used As Guinea Pigs
Project SHAD, an acronym for Shipboard Hazard and Defense, was part of the joint service chemical and biological warfare test program conducted during the 1960s. Project SHAD encompassed tests designed to identify US warships' vulnerabilities to attacks with chemical or biological warfare agents and to develop procedures to respond to such attacks while maintaining a war-fighting capability. Although classified, the Department of Defense has been actively pursuing declassification of relevant medical information. To date twelve SHAD projects have been evaluated and released for your review.
The SHAD program planned as many as a hundred individual tests and was part of the larger Deseret Test Center program. Many tests were never actually executed. DoD investigators plan to look at all Deseret Test Center’s chemical and biological tests conducted between 1963 and 1970
Of the 4,300 sailors known to be involved, to our knowledge, only 622 have been notified.
http://www.projectshad.org/index.htm
Statement
of
The Honorable William Winkenwerder, Jr., M.D., M.B.A.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs
on
Shipboard Hazard and Defense
Before the Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs
July 10, 2002
Mr. Chairman and members of this distinguished
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here today and thank you for your
continuing support of the men and women who have served in our Armed Forces.
As Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, I want to stress that the
Department of Defense is committed to ensuring that we deploy fit and healthy military
personnel, that we monitor their health and environmental exposures while they are
deployed, and that we assess their health status and address their health concerns
when they return. My Deployment Health Support Directorate is conducting the investigation
into Project SHAD. Today, I would like to explain some of the challenges we face
in the investigation into Project SHAD, and why I think problems associated with
that situation, particularly in regard to medical record keeping, are not likely
to occur for post-Gulf War operations.
As you know, Project SHAD (Shipboard Hazard and Defense) was a chemical and biological
weapons vulnerability testing program conducted in the 1960s by the Deseret Test
Center in Utah. In August of 2000, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs requested that
the Secretary of Defense provide information concerning three classified Project
SHAD tests: Autumn Gold, Copper Head and Shady Grove. In September 2000 DoD assigned
responsibility for fulfilling that request to the Deployment Health Support Directorate.
Within a month, VA and DoD personnel began meeting regularly to define what medically
relevant information the VA needed to address veterans' concerns. This collaborative
effort established a communications process, coordination for the exchange of information
between the agencies, and a format for fact sheets to inform the VA, veterans and
the public about the nature of these exposures and the agents used.
SHAD was part of a larger program called Project 112,
which was itself one of many projects run by the Deseret Test Center.
Project 112 consisted of 103 chemical and biological
warfare agent tests. SHAD involved thirty-four planned tests, many of which were
never performed. These were not clinical trials, but rather were done for operational
preparedness purposes. Leaders at the time thought they were appropriate tests given
the information they then had available. So far, our investigation indicates that
most of the tests were done using simulants that were thought to be harmless. Moreover,
service members involved in tests using live agents were appropriately protected.
Nonetheless, the Deployment Health Support Directorate quickly recognized the necessity
to investigate all Project 112 and SHAD tests,
and expanded the scope of the original effort.
The first year of this investigation we discovered the difficulties in obtaining
the needed medically relevant information and put systems in place to overcome them.
First, we had to find the needed documents. In the 1960's, joint operations were
not so common. The Army planned the SHAD tests, but for the most part the Navy and
Marine Corps conducted the tests, with assistance from the Air Force. The primary
planning was done at the Deseret Test Center, a facility that closed in the early
1970's. Records that were kept were stored at different facilities in different
geographic areas, ranging from Dugway Proving Grounds, Utah, to Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Maryland. Remember, these test plans and reports are not computer files
but paper records stored in boxes or folders in file cabinets, so finding what you
need is a painstaking manual process.
Learning who may have been involved in a particular test involves finding personnel
records in the Navy archives. Navy deck logs aren't found in the military system
at all, but are maintained by the National Archives and Records Administration.
At this point our investigators believe they have established the locations of most
of the relevant records. Of course, the ongoing search could lead to new locations
and we will pursue those leads until we have all relevant data.
When the desired test reports are located, there is still the task of declassification.
Most of the operation plans and results of these tests remain classified. These
documents contain operational information about ship vulnerability to and defenses
against chemical and biological weapons. These agents remain a threat to our forces
today so, as you can understand, these records can not be casually declassified.
DHSD developed a solution. Investigators with appropriate clearances comb through
the documents to identify the medically relevant data. Early on, VA staff members
who also held appropriate clearances joined our investigators to verify that the
information being sought was what they needed to help settle benefits questions.
Following the identification of these specific topic areas, our investigators requested
that specific information be declassified. The Army has greatly expedited this declassification
process.
When we first provided data to the VA we learned that DoD and VA computer systems
were not compatible. Both agencies have made the necessary adjustments to allow
the smooth transfer of this information. We now have the data the VA needs formatted
in such a way that they can use it immediately and easily. In fact, I believe that
one positive outcome of this investigation has been a new level of cooperation between
the VA and DoD that is focused on providing the information our veterans need and
deserve.
To date we have produced fact sheets on 12 SHAD tests, which involved between 2700
and 2800 service members. The VA has a process in place for notifying the service
members, however, we understand the VA has a significant challenge in identifying
them because at the time they served, they were identified by service numbers, not
their social security numbers. The process to translate service numbers to social
security numbers is also labor intensive. So, to give the VA time to make positive
identifications, we are implementing a process to provide the VA with the list of
names and service numbers as soon as we have them, before the investigation of a
particular test is completed. And as soon as complete information becomes available,
we will continue to share it with the VA and the public.
At the time of the project SHAD tests, there was little awareness of the possible
long-term effects of low level toxic exposures. Our recognition of the importance
of individual assignments, unit locations and documenting medically relevant exposures
following the Gulf War have dramatically changed our processes. Today, DoD monitors
the service member's environment closely. The U.S. Army Center for Health Promotion
and Preventive Medicine and the Naval Environmental Health Center maintain environmental
surveillance wherever our military forces go. For example, you may have seen news
reports of possible chemical warfare agent exposures at Karshi Khanabad Air Base
in Uzbekistan. Routine environmental monitoring discovered what appeared to be traces
of possible chemical agents on the base. The base commander immediately cleared
the areas where the contamination was suspected and notified troops of the situation.
Closer investigation proved that the substances that caused the alert were not chemical
warfare agents. However, that example does demonstrate that we have procedures to
protect our people from environmental dangers, and that we keep them aware of possible
risks.
We are also dedicated to improvements in medical record keeping. In this area, DoD
has stepped boldly into the 21st
century. The services have made individual efforts to fulfill today's requirements.
We plan to consolidate those efforts into a joint program under the Theater Medical
Information Program, or TMIP. TMIP, which is being tested right now, is a tri-Service
system designed to provide information to deployed medical forces to support all
medical functional areas, including medical logistics, blood management, patient
regulation and evacuation, medical intelligence, health care delivery and more.
TMIP will integrate several existing and developmental systems into a single system
that can be easily used by theater commanders and medical personnel in combat environments.
It will also provide an electronic record of care provided in theater that can be
entered into the individual's permanent medical record and provided to the VA
DoD is in the process of setting up a system that will monitor the health of all
military members for the duration of their service. It will begin with the Recruit
Assessment Program, which will collect comprehensive baseline health data from all
U.S. military personnel. That program is in pilot testing right now.
After deployments, service members now receive care based on a set of clinical practice
guidelines for post-deployment evaluation and treatment developed jointly by DoD
and VA medical personnel. The guidelines are designed to assist health care providers
in screening and evaluating service members and veterans with health concerns following
deployment.
At the other end of the system is a joint DoD/VA exit physical for service members
who are returning to civilian life.
We already have a number of initiatives working through our VA/DoD Executive Council,
co-chaired by myself and my colleague Dr. Roswell, the VA Under Secretary for Health.
This council provides the forum for senior health care leaders, including our Surgeons
General, to proactively address potential areas for further collaboration, and resolve
obstacles to sharing.
We are building on the success of our health care council through the newly established
VA/DoD Benefits Council, which is examining ways to expand and improve information
sharing, refining the process of records retrieval and identifying procedures to
improve the benefits claims process. The VA/DoD Joint Executive Council, co- chaired
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness and the Deputy Secretary
of the VA, brings the leadership of the Health and Benefits councils together quarterly
to demonstrate their commitment to improving inter-departmental cooperation at all
levels. As Under Secretary of Defense David Chu said of the first meeting, "Our
concern for the well-being of service members extends beyond just their time on
active duty." The two panels will work together to improve coordination between
the departments in such areas as health care services, benefits delivery, information
sharing and capital asset coordination. The future will hold increased cooperation
between our departments, because our focus is the health of our service members
throughout their military careers and throughout the rest of their lives.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I thank you and the members of this committee
for your outstanding and continuing support for the men and women of the Department
of Defense. Now, what are your questions?
Links:
Pentagon
slow to study chemical tests
VA HASN'T TOLD ALL SOLDIERS INVOLVED IN 1960S
Soldiers exposed in 109 chemical tests, Pentagon says
US Used Deadly Sarin in Hawaii Test-Pentagon
Pentagon: No More GI Guinea Pigs
The Pentagon gassed American soldiers and civilians in 1960s tests